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Diagnostic error, overconﬁdence and
self-knowledge
Quassim Cassam1
ABSTRACT According to the overconﬁdence hypothesis (OH), physician overconﬁdence is
a major factor contributing to diagnostic error in medicine. This article argues that OH can be
read as offering a personal, a sub-personal or a systemic explanation of diagnostic error. It is
argued that personal level overconﬁdence is an “epistemic vice”. The hypothesis that diag-
nostic errors due to overconﬁdence can be remedied by increasing physician self-knowledge
is shown to be questionable. Some epistemic vices or cognitive biases, including over-
conﬁdence, are “stealthy” in the sense that they obstruct their own detection. Even if the
barriers to self-knowledge can be overcome, some problematic traits are so deeply entren-
ched that even well-informed and motivated individuals might be unable to correct them. One
such trait is overconﬁdence. Alternative approaches to “debiasing” are considered and it is
argued that overconﬁdence is blameworthy only if it is understood as a personal level
epistemic vice rather than a sub-personal cognitive bias. This paper is published as part of a
collection on self-knowledge in and outside of illness.
DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.25 OPEN
1 University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy, Coventry, UK Correspondence: (e-mail: q.cassam@warwick.ac.uk)
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:17025 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.25 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms 1
Much has been written about the extent and causes ofdiagnostic error in medicine. Multiple studies suggestthat levels of diagnostic error remain “disappointingly
high” (Berner and Graber, 2008: S3) despite advances in medical
technology. One analysis concludes that “while the exact
prevalence of diagnostic error remains unknown, data from
autopsy series spanning several decades conservatively and
consistently reveal error rates of 10%–15%” (Schiff et al., 2009:
1881). Since autopsies are rare in many countries other methods
of tracking diagnostic error rates have had to be employed but the
overall picture is the same: diagnostic error is relatively common
(Kuhn, 2002; Graber, 2013; Singh et al., 2013).
Among the multifarious causes of diagnostic error one that has
attracted the attention of researchers is overconﬁdence. Accord-
ing to the overconﬁdence hypothesis (OH) physician over-
conﬁdence “is a major factor contributing to diagnostic error”
(Berner and Graber, 2008: S6). A natural suggestion is that if
(OH) is correct then one way to reduce levels of diagnostic error
would be to make physicians aware of the full extent of their
tendencies to err and the role of overconﬁdence in causing
diagnostic error. In effect, the proposal is that overconﬁdence and
diagnostic errors due to overconﬁdence can be addressed by
increasing physician self-knowledge or self-awareness (Borrell-
Carió and Epstein, 2004; Croskerry et al., 2013b).
In order to assess this proposal a better understanding is
required of overconﬁdence, (OH) and self-knowledge. Over-
conﬁdence can be conceived of in different ways and (OH)’s
explanation of diagnostic error can also be interpreted in different
ways depending on one’s view of overconﬁdence. In brief,
overconﬁdence can be viewed as a “sub-personal” cognitive bias
or as a personal or professional epistemic vice. Either way, it is
questionable to what extent diagnostic errors due to over-
conﬁdence can be remedied by self-knowledge. The issue, to put it
crudely, is whether the biases or vices that are responsible for
diagnostic error are also obstacles to self-knowledge.
A proper understanding of overconﬁdence is also the key to
another difﬁcult issue: how blameworthy are diagnostic errors
due to overconﬁdence? In his work on human error Reason
distinguishes between the “person approach” and the “system
approach” (Reason, 2000). The former focuses on the individual
origins of error while the latter attributes errors to their system
context. The person approach blames individuals or groups of
individuals for medical errors, including diagnostic errors, and
holds them personally responsible. It might seem that (OH)
subscribes to the person approach but only if overconﬁdence is an
epistemic vice rather than a sub-personal cognitive bias. On either
reading physician overconﬁdence may have a systemic explana-
tion that complicates the issue of blameworthiness.
The ﬁrst section of what follows will discuss (OH) and the
notion of overconﬁdence. The focus here will be on under-
standing this notion and identifying the type of explanation of
diagnostic error that (OH) offers. The following section will
discuss the suggestion that self-knowledge is a remedy for
physician overconﬁdence and the diagnostic errors to which it
gives rise. While this suggestion has obvious attractions it will be
seen to underestimate the obstacles to self-knowledge while
overestimating its beneﬁts. The ﬁnal section will reﬂect on the
issue of blameworthiness for diagnostic error, on the assumption
that (OH) is justiﬁed in attributing to such errors to physician
overconﬁdence. Alternative explanations of diagnostic error will
be considered along the way.
The overconﬁdence hypothesis (OH)
Overconﬁdence has been characterized in terms of calibration.
Subjects answer multiple-choice questions and are asked to state
their subjective probability that their answers are correct. Studies
suggest that when subjects report 100% conﬁdence the relative
frequency of correct answers is 80%; when subjects express 90%
conﬁdence they are right only 70% of the time (Lichtenstein et al.,
1982). Overconﬁdence can be deﬁned as “the difference between
mean conﬁdence and overall accuracy” (Kahneman and Tversky,
1996: 587), such that the former exceeds the latter. Diagnostic
calibration is “the relationship between diagnostic accuracy and
conﬁdence in that accuracy” (Meyer et al., 2013: 1952).
Overconﬁdence occurs when “the relationship between accuracy
and conﬁdence is miscalibrated or misaligned such that
conﬁdence is higher than it should be” (Meyer et al., 2013:
1953). In what sense is conﬁdence higher than it “should be”? An
example makes the point: “A patient who is informed by his
surgeon that she is 99% conﬁdent in his complete recovery may
be justiﬁably upset to learn that when the surgeon expressed that
level of conﬁdence she is actually correct only 75% of the time”
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1996: 588).
“Overconﬁdence” can be used to refer to positive illusions or to
“excessive certainty”. The former is the tendency to have positive
illusions about our merits relative to others. The latter “describes
the tendency we have to believe that our knowledge is more
certain that it really is” (Galloway, 2015: 16). The overconﬁdence
that is at issue here is primarily the latter type. Overconﬁdence in
this sense is related to arrogance and complacency (Berner and
Graber, 2008: S6). The dictionary deﬁnition of “arrogant” is
“excessively assertive or presumptuous; overbearing”. Arrogance
in this sense is not a necessary consequence of overconﬁdence.
Similarly, a person can be overconﬁdent without being compla-
cent, that is, without being smugly self-satisﬁed. Nevertheless,
overconﬁdence, arrogance and complacency are closely related in
practice. Overconﬁdence can cause arrogance, and the reverse
may also be true. Overconﬁdence and arrogance are in a
symbiotic relationship even if they are distinct mental properties.
Diagnostic error is “any mistake or failure in the diagnostic
process leading to a misdiagnosis, a missed diagnosis, or a delayed
diagnosis” (Schiff et al., 2009: 1882). (OH) posits a causal
relationship between diagnostic error and overconﬁdence:
according to (OH) the latter is a major cause of the former.
What is the causal pathway from overconﬁdence to diagnostic
error? One suggestion is that overconﬁdence is related to a
decreased likelihood of requesting additional diagnostic tests
(Meyer et al., 2013: 1956). One study showed that in difﬁcult
cases, where there is a large reduction in diagnostic accuracy,
physicians’ conﬁdence is only slightly lower than in less difﬁcult
cases with a lower likelihood of misdiagnosis. As a result of
overconﬁdence, “physicians might not request the additional
resources to facilitate diagnosis when they most need it” (Meyer
et al., 2013: 1957). Diagnostic error is, in these circumstances,
more likely. Other effects of overconﬁdence that may lead to
diagnostic and other errors include widespread non-compliance
with clinical guidelines and “the general tendency on the part of
physicians to disregard, or fail to use, decision-support resources”
(Berner and Graber, 2008: S7).
One way to summarize these causal pathways from over-
conﬁdence to diagnostic error would be think in terms of
insouciance: physician overconﬁdence can lead to an attitude of
insouciance when faced with difﬁcult cases. This attitude causes
behaviours (for example, failing to request additional diagnostic
tests) that can in turn lead to diagnostic error. It is an empirical
question whether this is the correct explanation of actual cases of
diagnostic error but (OH) is a non-starter unless something along
these lines is hypothesized. Causal explanations require the
identiﬁcation of causal pathways, and this means that it is not
enough simply to point to a correlation between overconﬁdence
and diagnostic error, even if such a correlation can be established.
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It also needs to be explained how physician overconﬁdence is
supposed to cause diagnostic error.
As noted above, Reason distinguishes two approaches to the
explanation of error, a system and a person approach. In many
cases of error, medical or otherwise, a more complex scheme is
required, and it is helpful to distinguish at least four types of
explanation:
(a) Personal explanations attribute error to the personal qualities
of individuals or groups of individuals. Carelessness, gullibility,
closed-mindedness, dogmatism, and prejudice and wishful
thinking are examples of such qualities. These qualities are
epistemic vices and explanations of error by reference to
epistemic vices are vice explanations (Cassam, 2016).
(b) Sub-personal explanations attribute error to the automatic,
involuntary, and non-conscious operation of hard-wired
cognitive mechanisms. The distinction between personal and
sub-personal explanations is due to Dennett. The personal
level is the “explanatory level of people and their sensations
and activities”. The contrast is with the “level of brains and
events in the nervous system” (Dennett, 2010: 105). In sub-
personal explanations “the person, qua person, does not
ﬁgure” (Elton, 2000: 2). These explanations are mechanistic in
a way that personal explanations are not, and the mechanisms
they posit are universal rather than person-speciﬁc.
(c) Situational explanations attribute error to contingent situa-
tional factors such as time pressure, distraction, overwork or
fatigue. The aim of such explanations is to shift the explanatory
focus away from the individuals towards the complex and
demanding situations in which individuals ﬁnd themselves.
(d) Systemic explanations attribute error to organizational or
systemic factors such as lack of resources, poor training, or
professional culture.
In terms of this taxonomy, which type of explanation of
diagnostic error does (OH) offer? This question is of practical
as well as theoretical importance since different interpretations of
(OH) are likely to point to different practical measures for
tackling diagnostic errors due to physician overconﬁdence.
The suggestion that (OH) proposes a situational explanation of
diagnostic error can be dismissed without further discussion since
overconﬁdence is not a “situational” factor in the relevant sense.
The live options are that overconﬁdence is personal, sub-personal
or systemic. Of these, the interpretation of (OH) as offering an
explanation of diagnostic error in personal terms is arguably the
most intuitive since overconﬁdence, arrogance and complacency
have a strong prima facie claim to be classiﬁed as epistemic vices.
Much depends, however, on how the notion of an epistemic vice
is understood. What is the conception of epistemic vices on which
(OH) can be regarded as proposing a vice explanation of
diagnostic error?
Epistemic vices are personal qualities. These qualities constitute
the building blocks of personal level explanations of a person’s
epistemic or other conduct. They include character traits, attitudes
and ways of thinking. Epistemic vices are character traits, attitudes
or ways of thinking that impede the acquisition, retention or
transfer of knowledge. These are all ways in which epistemic vices
“get in the way of knowledge” (Medina, 2013: 30). Closed-
mindedness is an epistemically vicious character trait, prejudice an
epistemically vicious attitude and wishful thinking an epistemically
vicious way of thinking. Closed-minded is something that a person
might be said to be, a prejudice is something that a person has,
while wishful thinking is what a person does.
Epistemic vices can on occasion be conducive to knowledge, or
at least to true belief. The proposal is that epistemic vices
normally obstruct the acquisition, retention or transfer of
knowledge, not that they invariably do so. Vices are harmful to
those who have them, and perhaps to others, and it is in the
nature of epistemic vices to be epistemically harmful. The Concise
Oxford Dictionary deﬁnes “vice” as “evil or grossly immoral
conduct” or, less dramatically, as a “defect or weakness of
character or conduct”. It is in the latter sense that epistemic vices
are vices: they are defects of epistemic character or conduct. The
description of closed-mindedness, wishful thinking and so on as
epistemic vices implies that they are blameworthy, since “vice
requires something for which we can be blamed” (Battaly, 2014:
62). Whatever the conditions for blameworthiness, epistemic
vices must satisfy them.
The case for reading (OH) as proposing an epistemic vice
explanation of diagnostic error is only as strong as the case for
regarding overconﬁdence and the related qualities of arrogance
and complacency as blameworthy personal qualities that are
normally epistemically harmful. Overconﬁdence, arrogance and
complacency are personal qualities in the sense that they are
qualities of people rather than of their brains or nervous systems.
It is people who are overconﬁdent or arrogant or complacent, and
explanations of their conduct by reference to these qualities are
ones in which the people qua people ﬁgure. In addition, personal
qualities are variable: they are not ones that every person has, or
has to the same degree, and this is another respect in which
overconﬁdence is personal. While some people are overconﬁdent
others are markedly underconﬁdent. These qualities can either be
viewed as character traits or as attitudes. Either way, they “express
who we are as people” (Battaly, 2016: 100).
Is overconﬁdence epistemically harmful? Its role in causing
diagnostic error is itself an illustration of the epistemic harm it
does. The aim of a diagnosis is to determine the cause of a
patient’s symptoms. To determine the cause is to know the cause,
and qualities that lead to diagnostic error are epistemically
harmful to the extent that they obstruct knowledge of the cause.
More generally, investigators who are excessively conﬁdent in
their own judgments and abilities are less likely to seek additional
evidence, even when such evidence is needed, or to enlist the help
of others from whose expertise they might beneﬁt. They are more
likely to bring their inquiries to a premature conclusion and to
take as settled questions that are not in fact settled. These are all
ways in which overconﬁdence gets in the way of knowledge. If the
claim that overconﬁdence is blameworthy can also be justiﬁed
(see below) then the only reasonable conclusion is that (OH) is
offering a personal level, vice explanation of diagnostic error.
This is not how all proponents of (OH) see things. Some argue
that bias is “one of the principal factors underlying diagnostic
error” (Croskerry et al., 2013a: 1) and regard overconﬁdence as
one such bias. Overconﬁdence bias has been deﬁned as the
“universal tendency to believe we know more than we do”
(Croskerry, 2003a: 778). This proposal draws on dual-process
theories of human psychology:
These theories come in different forms, but all agree in
positing two distinct processing mechanisms for a given task,
which employ different procedures and may yield different,
and sometimes conﬂicting, results. Typically, one of the
processes is characterized as fast, effortless, automatic,
nonconscious, inﬂexible, heavily contextualized, and unde-
manding of working memory, and the other as effortful,
controlled, conscious, ﬂexible, decontextualized, and demand-
ing of working memory (Evans and Frankish, 2009: 1).
Some dual-process theories are also theories of mental
architecture. They claim that “human central cognition is
composed of two multi-purpose reasoning systems, usually called
System 1 and System 2, the operations of the former having
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fast-process characteristics (….) and those of the latter slow-
process ones” (Evans and Frankish, 2009: 1). Dual-process
theories of this form are dual-system theories.
System 1 uses heuristics. A heuristic is a “simple procedure that
helps ﬁnd adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difﬁcult
questions” (Kahneman, 2011: 98). In the medical context heuristics
have been described as “subconscious rules of thumb” that
“clinicians use to solve diagnostic puzzles” (Berner and Graber,
2008: S8). Although heuristics are generally useful they “sometimes
lead to severe and systematic errors” (Kahneman, 2011: 419).
These errors are biases. In these terms, overconﬁdence can either
be regarded as a bias in its own right or as caused by other more
fundamental biases. Conﬁrmation bias is the tendency to search
selectively for evidence or information that conﬁrms what one
already believes. One proposal is that conﬁrmation bias is the cause
of overconﬁdence bias (Koriat et al., 1980). Explanations of
diagnostic error by reference to overconﬁdence bias are sub-
personal to the extent that they attribute this bias to automatic,
involuntary and unconscious System 1 processing. The explanation
is mechanistic rather than personal and the posited explanatory
bias is not a defect of epistemic character or conduct. It is a
reﬂection of how the human cognitive apparatus works, and in all
probability has its roots deep in our evolutionary history.
What is the relationship between sub-personal and personal
explanations of diagnostic error? The recognition that there are two
levels of explanation “gives birth to the burden of relating them”
(Dennett, 2010: 107). Several views are possible. Distinctivism is the
view that personal and sub-personal explanations are distinct and
autonomous. Neither is reducible to the other and each is capable
of explaining diagnostic error. This is a reﬂection of the fact that
epistemic vices are distinct from sub-personal cognitive biases and
not reducible to such biases. Reductionism is the view that personal
explanations of diagnostic error are reducible to sub-personal
explanations. On this view, the so-called “epistemic vices” that
ﬁgure in personal explanations are constituted by sub-personal
cognitive biases: to have a particular epistemic vice just is to have
the corresponding sub-personal bias. A third approach is
eliminativism. This holds that epistemic vices don’t exist and talk
of sub-personal biases should replace talk of epistemic vices.
There are difﬁculties with all three options. Distinctivism is
problematic since it isn’t credible that the personal and sub-
personal levels are wholly autonomous. The sub-personal/
personal distinction is closely related to, if not identical with,
the System 1/ System 2 distinction, and System 2 is “heavily
dependent on System 1” (Frankish, 2009: 97). Even if over-
conﬁdence is a personal-level epistemic vice it is highly likely to
be inﬂuenced by sub-personal biases. Reductionism faces the
difﬁculty that there are aspects of our epistemic conduct or
character that cannot plausibly be explained in purely sub-
personal terms, not least because these aspects are far from
universal. They are not, in this sense, built into human cognitive
apparatus. A case in point is arrogance, which is not a trait of all
humans. There is no System 1 explanation of the fact that some
people, including physicians, are overbearing, excessively assertive
and presumptuous, while others are not. These are personal
qualities that can neither be reduced to sub-personal biases nor
eliminated if the aim is to explain the full variety of human
epistemic conduct. Arrogance is not an illusion.
A way to reconcile the genuine insights of personal and sub-
personal conceptions of overconﬁdence is to distinguish between
overconﬁdence as a sub-personal cognitive bias and over-
conﬁdence as a personal epistemic vice. It is in the latter sense
that overconﬁdence is closely related to arrogance and compla-
cency since these are character traits rather than biases. This is
not to say that biases or their underpinning heuristics can only be
sub-personal. Overconﬁdence as an epistemic vice can be
regarded as a bias but overconﬁdence in this sense is a personal
rather than a sub-personal bias. Biases and heuristics can be
personal or sub-personal (Evans, 2009: 36; Kahneman, 2011:
120), and personal level overconﬁdence is the tendency to believe
that one knows more than one does. This tendency is “prevalent
but not universal” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996: 587). It is
caused in part by sub-personal biases but is neither identical with
nor reducible to them. Personal and sub-personal overconﬁdence
can both cause insouciance and thereby be responsible for
diagnostic error.
On this pluralist account of overconﬁdence, (OH) can either be
read as propounding a sub-personal or a personal explanation of
diagnostic error. Both readings of (OH) are feasible and it needs
to be made clear which reading is intended when diagnostic error
is attributed to overconﬁdence in a given case. In either case,
systemic factors may also come into play, but especially in
relation to personal level overconﬁdence. There are several ways
in which this might happen. The culture of medicine, which is a
broadly systemic factor, might be thought to encourage over-
conﬁdence in physicians since “conﬁdence is valued over
uncertainty and there is a prevailing censure against disclosing
uncertainty to patients” (Croskerry and Norman, 2008: S26).
Particular specialisms might attract individuals who are highly
conﬁdent or overconﬁdent. It has been suggested, for example,
that “a certain bravado goes with being a surgeon” and that “a
surgeon has to have a high level of conﬁdence to operate”
(Groopman, 2008: 169). While patients “want their physicians to
be highly competent and conﬁdent” (Kerr, 2007: 704), it is
doubtful that they want them to be overconﬁdent. Further
research into what patients want is needed.
To the extent that overconﬁdence is an epistemic vice that is
encouraged by the professional culture of medicine, it might be
described as a “professional vice” (Greenhalgh, 2016). If there is
evidence that overconﬁdent individuals are more likely to be
recruited into medical profession, and also more likely to be
promoted, then diagnostic errors caused by overconﬁdence can
be said to have a partly systemic explanation. However, it is
possible to acknowledge the role of systemic factors in relation to
diagnostic error while continuing to endorse (OH). The reason is
not just that (OH) only identiﬁes overconﬁdence as a major
factor contributing to diagnostic error and so leaves room for
other explanations. The reason is that physician overconﬁdence is
itself, at least to some extent, a systemic factor.
In sum, personal, sub-personal and systemic factors all have a
part to play in causing diagnostic error. These factors include
overconﬁdence, which can be viewed as personal, as sub-personal
or as systemic. The question whether, overconﬁdence is, as (OH)
proposes, a major factor contributing to diagnostic error cannot
be answered without further research and an examination of
other causes of diagnostic error. Although such an examination
cannot be undertaken here it should be remarked that among the
other factors that may give rise to diagnostic and other medical
errors is underconﬁdence, where mean conﬁdence is lower than
overall accuracy. Underconﬁdence has been described as a
cognitive bias and can also be viewed as an epistemic vice.
Whether underconﬁdence is more or less epistemically harmful
than overconﬁdence cannot be known a priori. However, there is
compelling evidence that underconﬁdence and overconﬁdence
can co-exist. Reﬂection on this observation promises to cast
further light on the nature of overconﬁdence and the appropriate
measures for tackling it.
Self-knowledge
It is reasonable to assume that the role of overconﬁdence in
causing diagnostic error is not widely recognized by physicians,
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and that their knowledge of their own cognitive biases and
epistemic vices is also limited. Physicians are, in this respect, no
different from the wider population. It might be suggested that
one measure to mitigate physician overconﬁdence and its adverse
effects would be to ﬁll in these knowledge gaps. Two types of
knowledge are relevant. The ﬁrst is working knowledge of the
effect of cognitive biases and epistemic vices on clinical decision-
making generally. The second is knowledge on the part of
individual physicians of their own cognitive biases and epistemic
vices. It isn’t enough for them to know in the abstract that sub-
personal biases and epistemic vices are causes of diagnostic error.
They also need to accept that they have biases and vices that
might be responsible for their mistakes. The ﬁrst kind of
knowledge will be referred to here as working knowledge and
the second as self-knowledge.
Working knowledge and self-knowledge are only the start. A
physician might have both types of knowledge but not be
motivated to change their diagnostic practices or correct their
own biases or vices. Self-knowledge doesn’t automatically lead to
self-improvement. A further relevant factor is the ability to
change. The extent to which known unwanted biases can be
avoided, controlled or corrected is unclear (Wilson and Brekke,
1994). In the case of entrenched biases a systemic response may
be more appropriate, including what have been called “cognitive
forcing strategies” (Croskerry, 2003b: 114). Properly understood,
these strategies take bias-control out of the hands of individuals.
Examples of such strategies will be given below, following
consideration of the limitations of self-knowledge as a tool for
mitigating physician overconﬁdence.
Some epistemic vices are “stealthier” than others: by their
nature they evade detection by those who have them (Cassam,
2015). They are not undetectable but are harder to detect in
oneself than other vices. The stealthiness of some epistemic vices
can be accounted for as follows: detection of one’s own epistemic
vices requires a process of active critical reﬂection (Fricker, 2007:
97). Stealthy vices are ones that inhibit such reﬂection or
otherwise reduce its effectiveness. All epistemic vices may be
expected to some negative impact on a thinker’s active critical
reﬂection but some more than others. Effective critical reﬂection
on one’s own epistemic and other vices requires the possession
and exercise of epistemic virtues such as open-mindedness,
sensitivity to evidence, and the humility to acknowledge one’s
vices. One possibility is that the necessary virtues co-exist with
the vices that critical reﬂection aims to uncover. For example,
carelessness is an epistemic vice that can co-exist with epistemic
virtues such as open-mindedness, sensitivity to evidence and
humility. It is not in the nature of carelessness to evade detection
by active critical reﬂection since being careless need not deprive
one of the ability to detect one’s carelessness. Other factors, such
as a desire to think well of oneself, might get in the way of
knowledge of one’s own carelessness but this is not a case of an
epistemic vice impeding its own detection.
In contrast, closed-mindedness is antithetical to the epistemic
virtues required for the discovery of one’s epistemic vices by
reﬂection. If a person is closed-minded then their mind may well
be closed to the possibility that they are closed-minded. This is
not just a reﬂection of the general desire to think well of oneself
but of the role of closed-mindedness in directly negating one of
the key epistemic virtues required for active critical reﬂection, the
virtue of open-mindedness. Complacency is another stealthy vice.
Being complacent is hardly conducive to active critical reﬂection
on one’s complacency. This suggests a spectrum of epistemic
vices, with less stealthy epistemic vices at one end and more
stealthy vices at the other. In these terms, there is a case for
locating overconﬁdence and complacency at the stealthier end of
the spectrum, on the basis that they are closely associated with
lack of the epistemic humility that is required for active and
honest critical reﬂection on one’s epistemic defects.
Knowledge of one’s sub-personal cognitive biases is, if
anything, even harder to attain than knowledge of one’s personal
epistemic vices. Sub-personal biases are not introspectable and
unlikely to be detected by unaided critical reﬂection, however
earnest. Their nature, existence and inﬂuence has been brought to
light by the work of cognitive psychologists, and a person with
working knowledge of this research might infer that they are not
immune to cognitive biases. Working knowledge of cognitive
psychology cannot be assumed, however, and overconﬁdence
might induce physicians who are aware of the potential impact of
biases on clinical judgement to believe that they are not
vulnerable to them (Croskerry et al., 2013b: ii 66). This is a
reﬂection of the fact that “the same kinds of biases that distort our
thinking in general also distort our thinking about the biases
themselves” (Horton, 2004).
Despite the obstacles to self-knowledge, knowledge of one’s
own cognitive biases and epistemic vices is not ruled out.
Epistemic vices may be domain-speciﬁc and the domains in
which a particular epistemic vice makes itself felt need not include
active critical reﬂection on one’s own vices and biases. In
addition, active critical reﬂection on one’s “cognitive sins”
(Adams, 1985: 17) is not the only source of self-knowledge.
Feedback is another potential source, although even this route to
self-knowledge presupposes a willingness to listen that some may
lack. An alternative route to self-knowledge is the occurrence of a
single traumatic event, such as the unexpected death of a patient,
that fundamentally changes a physician’s self-conception and
causes them to reﬂect on their epistemic vices and biases in ways
that would not otherwise have been possible (Croskerry et al.,
2013b: ii 66). Such “transformative experiences” (Paul, 2014) may
motivate change and self-improvement as well as lead to self-
knowledge. It is when things go wrong that hitherto over-
conﬁdent and complacent clinicians may be motivated to reﬂect
on their defects and change their diagnostic practices. Flawed
practices and procedures may need to be “unlearned” (Rushmer
and Davies, 2004), and transformative experiences may bring
about “transformative unlearning” (Macdonald, 2002).
As noted above, being motivated to correct a bias one knows
one has is no guarantee that one will be able to correct it. Some
biases may be so deeply entrenched that even well-informed and
motivated individuals might be unable to shake them off.
Overconﬁdence is a case in point. This has been deﬁned as the
discrepancy between single-event conﬁdences and the actual
relative frequency of correct answers, such that the former
exceeds the latter. For example, if a subject reports 100%
conﬁdence in a particular answer but the actual frequency of
correct answers when they report this level of conﬁdence is
75% then they are described as “overconﬁdent”. However, when
the same subjects are asked several questions and invited to
estimate the frequency of correct answers their estimated
frequencies are “practically identical with actual frequencies,
with even a small tendency towards underestimation”
(Gigerenzer, 1991: 6). At this level there is no “overconﬁdence
bias”. Nevertheless, subjects can “maintain a high degree of
conﬁdence in the validity of speciﬁc answers even when they
know that their overall hit rate is low” (Kahneman and Tversky,
1996: 588).
This phenomenon has been described as the “illusion of
validity”. In one well known example of this illusion, candidates
for ofﬁcer training in the Israeli army were observed and
evaluated on the basis of performance in a group leadership
exercise. Evaluators who made conﬁdent judgements regarding
the suitability of individual candidates for ofﬁcer training were
told in later feedback sessions that their ability to predict
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performance at ofﬁcer training school was negligible. One of the
evaluators commented:
What happened was remarkable. The global evidence of
our previous failure should have shaken our conﬁdence in
our judgments of the candidates, but it did not. It should
also have caused us to moderate our predictions, but it did
not. We knew as a general fact that our predictions were
little better than random guesses, but we continued to feel
and act as if each of our speciﬁc predictions was valid
(Kahneman, 2011: 211).
Kahneman compares the illusion of validity with the
Müller-Lyer illusion in which two lines that are known to be
equal in length are seen as unequal. Neither knowing that the
lines are equal nor being motivated to see them as equal is
sufﬁcient to bring it about that they are seen as equal. By the
same token, in cases such as those described by Kahneman,
neither knowing that one’s track record is poor nor being
motivated to do better may be sufﬁcient to shake one’s
unwarranted conﬁdence in one’s judgement in an individual
case. In such cases, other means of reigning in overconﬁdence will
need to be found.
In his work on “cognitive debiasing”, Croskerry proposes that
clinicians can develop “cognitive forcing strategies” to “abort” the
latent biases that cause diagnostic error (2003b: 110). A cognitive
forcing strategy is “a deliberate, conscious selection of a particular
strategy in a speciﬁc situation to optimize decisonmaking and
avoid error” (Croskerry, 2003b: 115). Cognitive forcing is
essentially a form of self-regulation: physicians are urged to
self-monitor for bias and follow rules that are designed to counter
cognitive pitfalls. Yet in the case of stealthy and entrenched biases
this is unlikely to be sufﬁcient since self-monitoring and self-
regulation are not immune to the cognitive pitfalls and illusions
they are designed to counter. There is, however, another way of
understanding the notion of a cognitive forcing strategy on which
this approach offers greater promise.
The alternative reading of cognitive forcing draws on the
notion of a forcing function. Forcing functions are “built into
system design” with a view to minimizing error (Croskerry,
2003b: 115). An example is the design of vehicle locking systems
to prevent car drivers from locking themselves out of their cars: it
is not possible to lock the car door as long as the key has not been
removed from the ignition. Similarly:
A person might engineer her “external” epistemic environ-
ment in other ways to ensure that her intentions and values
are more ﬂuidly expressed in her actions and judgements,
and not distorted by the operation of implicit biases. For
instance, if one is (justiﬁably) worried about implicit biases
corrupting the assessment of candidates in a job search, one
can take measures to remove information from application
dossiers that may trigger those implicit biases in the
ﬁrst place (Holroyd and Kelly, 2016: 121–2).
What is described here is a programme of bias-control
rather than debiasing. The primary aim is not to correct
implicit biases but to mitigate their consequences by measures
designed to prevent them from taking effect. The removal of
certain types of identifying information from application dossiers
is a forcing function, albeit one engineered by the subject
herself. In this scenario, knowledge of the harmful effects of
cognitive biases and a favourable disposition towards bias control
are both presupposed. However, forcing functions need not be
self-imposed and can be built into system design by external
agencies.
The main attraction of forcing functions is that they take bias-
control out of the hands of bias-prone individuals who may not
see the need for special measures to tackle their biases or who
may lack the motivation to self-monitor and follow rules designed
to avoid cognitive pitfalls. Forcing functions will be especially
appropriate in relation to biases that even well-informed and
epistemically conscientious individuals ﬁnd it difﬁcult to shake
off. The precise design of such forcing functions in clinical
contexts cannot be discussed here but the proposal can be
succinctly stated: to the extent that overconﬁdence is a major
cause of diagnostic error steps need to be taken either to reduce
physician overconﬁdence or lessen its harmful effects. While
working knowledge and self-knowledge might prove helpful in
both regards, there are good reasons to be sceptical about their
efﬁcacy in bringing about debiasing or epistemic vice reduction.
That being the case, forcing functions represent a promising
alternative.
Blameworthiness
To what extent are diagnostic errors caused by physician
overconﬁdence or other epistemic vices or biases blameworthy?
The issues here are too complex to be discussed in depth but it
would nevertheless be appropriate to note the following: on a
“voluntarist” conception of moral responsibility and blame-
worthiness we are blameworthy only for what is within our
voluntary control. It might seem, therefore, that cognitive biases
and epistemic vices cannot be deemed blameworthy since they
are not within our voluntary control. Where an individual
physician’s overconﬁdence leads to diagnostic errors with serious
consequences the physician is causally responsible for those
errors and their consequences but not blameworthy in a
deeper sense unless their overconﬁdence is within their voluntary
control.
One response to this line of argument is to suggest that
at least some of a person’s cognitive biases and epistemic vices
are, in the relevant sense, within their voluntary control. The
control might be indirect rather than direct but sufﬁcient for
blameworthiness. Another view is that voluntary control, direct
or indirect, is not necessary for blameworthiness. This is the view
to be defended here. It has been noted that there many
blameworthy states of mind that are involuntary. Such objec-
tionable states of mind include hatred, jealousy and contempt for
other people (Adams, 1985: 4). Other “involuntary sins” are
cognitive failures:
Some examples are: believing that certain people do not have
rights that they do in fact have; perceiving other members of
some social group as less capable than they actually are;
failing to notice indications of other people’s feelings; and
holding too high an opinion of one’s own attainments. These
failures are not in general voluntary (Adams, 1985: 18).
In that case, what makes such cognitive failures blameworthy?
According to the “rational relations view” (Smith, 2008: 382),
only features of a person that reﬂect her rational activity, that
is, her judgments or evaluative assessments are genuinely
blameworthy. A state of mind is blameworthy, on this account,
only if its subject can be asked to justify it and to reassess
it if an adequate justiﬁcation cannot be provided. This explains,
for example, why selﬁshness is blameworthy whereas stupidity
is not.
This account implies that sub-personal cognitive biases may
not be blameworthy in so far as they do not reﬂect a person’s
judgements or evaluative assessments. Personal level epistemic
vices, in contrast, can be regarded as genuinely blameworthy
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regardless of whether they are within our voluntary control. For
example, the arrogant person “has a high opinion of himself” and
treats others with disdain because he believes “he is a better
person according to the general standards governing what counts
as a successful human specimen” (Tiberius and Walker 1998:
382). On this view, arrogance plainly reﬂects a person’s evaluative
assessment of himself; it is an evaluative assessment of himself
and others. As such, a person can be asked to justify his self-
assessment and his disdain. Even if he has talents that few others
have this does not make him a better person or justify his low
opinion of those who lack his talents.
As noted above, overconﬁdence can either be regarded as a
sub-personal cognitive bias or as a personal level epistemic vice.
Overconﬁdence in the ﬁrst sense may not be blameworthy but
overconﬁdence in the second sense is a different matter. It is
reﬂective of a person’s evaluative assessment of how much they
know and, in this sense, reﬂective of their rational activity. They
can be challenged to justify their evaluation and “to acknowledge
fault if an adequate defense cannot be provided” (Smith, 2008:
370). Regardless of whether overconﬁdence is a professional
epistemic vice, it is no less blameworthy than the arrogance to
which it is closely related. Both arrogance and overconﬁdence
might be viewed as objectionable in themselves or an objection-
able in virtue of their harmful effects. In neither case does the fact
—if it is a fact—that these states of mind are involuntary imply
that they are not blameworthy.
From the fact that a person is blameworthy it does not follow
that it is appropriate to blame them. It has been argued that
naming, blaming and shaming healthcare professionals for
diagnostic and other medical errors is largely ineffective and
counterproductive if the priority is to improve patient safety
(Reason, 2013: 101). From this perspective the causes of medical
error are largely systemic rather than personal and the
appropriate response to such errors is not to blame individuals
but to construct adequate system defences. However, physician
overconﬁdence is an example of a cause of error that is both
systemic and personal. To the extent that physician over-
conﬁdence is a fact of medical life a systems response that
incorporates forcing functions might indeed be the most
appropriate response. Nevertheless, regardless of whether blam-
ing improves patient safety, it needs to be recognized that
overconﬁdence and arrogance are objectionable traits in a
physician, and that it is not unreasonable to regard them as, at
least to some extent, blameworthy.
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